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On 11 March 2011, a powerful earthquake and tsunami off north-east Japan left over 17,000 6 people either dead or missing. Cooling systems at the Fukushima Dai'ichi nuclear power plant The nuclear disaster particularly affected Fukushima's coastal corridor, known as Hamadori.
13
Many of the approximately 154,000 people evacuated due to radioactivity were from
14
Hamadori. Whilst remediation is underway, areas remain where residents will have long-term 15 difficulties returning (annual air dose exposure estimated over 50 milliSieverts/year). Sites for framings, but rather a two-way dialogue for balancing differing views of risk in decision-57 making. So 'communicating' risk about radioactivity in Iwaki ought to mean listening to -58 and acting on -the concerns of citizens and stakeholders as well as information provision.
59
Likewise, we acknowledge from Bradbury (1989) is a mistake to dismiss public anxiety towards radiation risks as being "irrational" or "wrong"'.
63
We hence understand 'risk perception ' 2014) and the need to imagine problems stretching into the future due to long timescales over 95 which disaster recovery and remediation necessarily occur (Westerdahl, 2014; Lofquist, 2015) .
96
Moving towards governing radioactivity risk in practice, Fahlquist and Roeser (2015) Given these complexities in environmental radioactivity risk perception, a qualitative However, as a guard against analysing the translation rather than the 'original' (Smith, 1996) 155 the Japanese-language recordings in the main formed the basis for analysis. This also meant 156 interpretation progressed as far as possible in the same language to that in which the original 157 research was undertaken (Gawlewicz, 2016) . The data was analysed qualitatively, identifying Pidgeon, 2012). In Section 5 we reflect on these challenges around reliability and language.
170
The rest of this paper discusses themes the authors identified -trust, uncertainty, traceability 171 of radiation, and socio-cultural dimensions of risk. Given the small and intensive sample size,
172
it should be reiterated that our aim is to draw wider lessons for how publics and stakeholders More than any differences in data on radioactivity itself provided by these various The fishers' ultimate objective is clearly restarting commercial fisheries and the life they had 226 before the disaster. Yet doing so too quickly could equally back-fire and jeopardise their 227 livelihood if they are seen to be responsible for exposing consumers to contaminated fish. For people who don't eat the fish, it seems to be that they don ' The risk communicators here may be seen to be embedded within the community and hence translates into a lack of trustworthiness, which as the third quote indicates is intensified by the 301 step-change in relationship between the operator and community since the disaster. The implication of fuhyo higai is that economic harm to Fukushima's produce and tourism 323 stems from a lack of consumer information, and that more and/or better education is required 324 to dispel such baseless rumours. Kimura and Katano (2014) Citizens or stakeholders can actively collect environmental radioactivity data -for land-based able to raise issues they themselves feel are of concern, with local government staff too given 541 a chance to air their views as citizens (albeit to a research project rather than a direct planning 542 24 consultation). Yet in order for this kind of discussion to emerge it is crucial for the involved 543 parties to have a space where they feel they can air their concerns. In the case of fishers, this 544 is an informal meeting with opportunity for discussion with civil servants before and after.
545
For the residents, it is a closed discussion with facilitators perceived as non-judgmental and 546 not overly invested in the decision reached. We finish by considering our findings in light of the four principles for future risk 562 communication laid down by Kasperson (2014) . We draw links between Kasperson's 563 thoughts and our findings to illustrate ongoing challenges for engagement on risk and 564 uncertainty. We also reflect on future directions for Fukushima-specific and wider 565 environmental risk research raised by this study. 
607
Attention will also be needed to identify which uncertainties can and cannot be reduced over We lastly discuss limitations of the study and directions for future research. As noted in 641 Section 3, the iterative and highly qualitative data analysis technique deployed in this paper 642 28 makes quantifying the reliability of the analysis by assessing inter-rater reliability difficult.
643
We nevertheless believe there is value in analysis techniques that afford the researcher greater 644 interpretative flexibility given the overarching concern with avoiding assumptions about how 645 risk bearers will perceive or respond to risks. However, this does raise a wider issue about 
